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Cybersurveilliance intrusions necessitate a different Fourth Amendment est
than the privacy test set forth by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States' 50
years ago. As part of the Symposium, Katz at 50: The Fourth Amendment in the
Digital Age, this Article aims to illustrate why the transformation of Fourth
Amendment doctrine is not only necessary with the increasing adoption of
cybersurveillance technologies, but has already begun.2 Courts are increasingly
confronted with the constitutional implications of mass surveillance made possible
by big data governance.3 For example, suspicionless mass data collection, predic-
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. I would like to extend my deep
gratitude to those who graciously offered comments on this draft, or who offered perspectives and expertise on
this research through our thoughtful discussions: Alvaro Bedoya, Andrew Christensen, Jennifer Daskal, Laura
Donohue, Josh Fairfield, David Gray, Stephen Henderson, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Erik Luna, Tim MacDon-
nell, Russ Miller, Steve Miskinis, Paul Ohm, Christopher Slobogin, and apologies to anyone whom I might have
omitted. In addition, this research benefited greatly from the discussions generated from the American Criminal
Law Review 2017 Symposium: Katz at 50: The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age. Many thanks to the
research assistance of Alexandra Klein, Kirby Kreider, and Bo Mahr. All errors and omissions are my own. This
work is a companion piece to Margaret Hu, Orwell's 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance
Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819 (2018).
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Susan W.
Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 Miss. L.J. 1 (2005); Laura K. Donohue,
The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of
Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The
"Smart" Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 547 (2017); David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1181 (2015); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REv. 62
(2013); Adam Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585 (2016); Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Search Warrants in an Era
ofDigital Evidence, 75 Miss. L.J. 85 (2005); Alex Kozinski & Eric S. Nguyen, Has Technology Killed the Fourth
Amendment?, 2011-2012 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 15 (2011); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A
Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 (2017);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1991); Christopher
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Techno-
logical Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L.
REv. 1511 (2010); see infra Part III.
3. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 757 (2014); Laura K.
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 117 (2015); Margaret Hu, Small Data Cybersurveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REv.
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tive analysis, and ex ante policing all present emerging and unresolved constitu-
4tional issues.
To contextualize why a new approach to the Fourth Amendment is essential, this
Article describes two emerging cybersurveillance tools. The first cybersurveil-
lance tool, Geofeedia,5 has been deployed by state and local law enforcement.6
Geofeedia uses a process known as "geofencing" to draw a virtual barrier around a
particular geographic region, and then identifies and tracks public social media
posts within that region for predictive policing purposes.7 The second tool, Future
773 (2015); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Stephen Rushin, The
Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281 [hereinafter Rushin, The
Judicial Response]; Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 317 (2008); Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: The Future of Internet Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139
(2004).
4. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-11
(2008) ("Governance in the National Surveillance State is increasingly statistically oriented, ex ante and
preventative, rather than focused on deterrence and ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing."); Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment o the
National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 489 (2006). "Like preventive measures, policing measures can
be either ex ante or ex post, according to whether they function before-or only after-the wrong occurs."
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 706 (1997). Ex ante policing has been defined as a "form of continuous
monitoring ... [that] can deter misconduct by increasing the likelihood that it will be detected and sanctioned." Id.
Although this definition refers to the corporate context, the principles remain the same regarding criminal policing
applications. See, e.g., David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating Preventive Justice, 9 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 501 (2015); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2014); see also Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes ofAge, 97 MINN. L. REv. 407 (2012); Laura K.
Donohue, The Dawn of Social Intelligence (SOCINT), 63 DRAKE L. REV. 1061 (2015); Collins T. Fitzpatrick,
Protecting the Fourth Amendment So We Do Not Sacrifice Freedom for Security, 2015 Wis. L. REV. 1; David
Gray, A Collective Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189 (2015) [hereinafter
Gray, A Collective Right]; Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 633 (2017); Margaret Hu,
Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAw (David
Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency
Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REv. 269 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U.
PA. L. REv. 91 (2016); Nadine Strossen, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Additional Constitutional Guarantees
that Mass Surveillance Violates, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 1143 (2015); Russell L. Weaver, The FourthAmendment and
Technologically Based Surveillance, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 231 (2015).
5. See GEOFEEDIA, https://geofeedia.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
6. See, e.g., Jonah Engel Bromwich, Daniel Victor & Mike Isaac, Police Use Surveillance Tool to Scan Social
Media, A.C.L. U. Says, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/technology/aclu-facebook-
twitter-instagram-geofeedia.html?_r=0; Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram
Sent Feeds that Helped Police Track Minorities in Ferguson and Baltimore, Report Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 11,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/10/11/facebook-twitter-and-instagram-sent-
feeds-that-helped-police-track-minorities-in-ferguson-and-baltimore-aclu-says/?utmterm=.c74a5bc5eb08; Mat-
thew Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance Product Marketed to
Target Activists of Color, ACLU (Oct. 11, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/facebook-
instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillance-product-marketed; Nicole Ozer, Police Use of Social
Media Surveillance Software is Escalating, and Activists are in the Digital Crosshairs, ACLU (Sep. 22, 2016,
2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-use-social-media-surveillance-software-escalating-and-
activists-are-digital; infra notes 42-58.
7. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
128
CYBERSURVEILLANCE INTRUSIONS AND THE KATZ PRIVACY TEST
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST), is under development by the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)." FAST is another predictive
policing tool that analyzes physiological and behavioral signals with the goal of
identifying "malintent": an individual's predilection for disruptive or violent
behavior.9 Both Geofeedia and FAST seem to fall outside the scope of protections
afforded by existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. o
Under the Fourth Amendment, unreasonable searches and seizures are
prohibited-but reasonable searches may be permissible. For 50 years, Katz v.
United States" has defined the federal courts' approach to evaluating what is a
"reasonable" law enforcement action under the Fourth Amendment. The Katz test
assesses whether law enforcement has violated an individual's "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy."1 2 This test is traditionally used to
determine whether a search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.1 3 Katz focuses on whether an individual intended to keep informa-
tion private1 4 and whether information had been previously disclosed.1 5 Techno-
logical developments, however, may change which expectations of privacy are
"reasonable," calling the continued viability of the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test into question. 16
Thus far, the Supreme Court has begun to discern implications of big data
governance structures and policies. In the 2012 case of United States v. Jones,1 7 the
Court considered the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking.' During oral
argument, several Justices signaled a concern that GPS geolocational data collec-
tion could extend beyond one GPS device attached to a single vehicle in the course
8. See Sharon Weinberger, Intent to Deceive?, 465 NATURE 412, 414-15 (2010); infra notes 61-77 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) ("Our later cases have applied the analysis of Justice
Harlan's concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy."'); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984) (explaining that law
enforcement action that does not infringe on a "legitimate expectation of privacy ... [is] not a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
14. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 ("Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.").
15. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring); see also supra notes 2-4.
17. Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
18. Id. at 402.
2018] 129
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
of a small data investigation.1 9 Specifically, members of the Court expressed
concern that GPS devices could be attached to all vehicles,2 0 and speculated, for
example, Departments of Motor Vehicles could include GPS devices on license
plates.2 1 The Court discussed the potential for universal GPS tracking of every
vehicle to be mandated under state or federal law 2 2 or standardized in vehicle
manufacturing.2 3
The government attempted to assuage the Court's concern over the specter of
mass surveillance by pointing out that "[t]his case does not involve universal
surveillance of every member of this Court or every member of the society. It
involves limited surveillance of somebody who was suspected of drug activity."
Ultimately, the Court refrained from engaging in a full analysis of whether Katz's
reasonable expectation of privacy was applicable in a warrantless GPS tracking
context. Instead, it resorted to an approach to the Fourth Amendment analysis that
relied on trespass theory, which, as the Court explained, is an alternative to Katz.25
Taking a narrow approach, the Court held that "the Government's installation of a
GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] 'search."'2 6
Similarly, in the 2014 case of Riley v. California,2 7 the Court considered whether
a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest violates the Fourth
Amendment.28 During oral argument, the Court grappled with the difference
between a search of a cell phone and a search of an individual's other effects in a
search incident to arrest.29 Digital data, as the Court pointed out, is different
because "a person can only carry so much on their person . . . [but] with digital
cameras people take endless photos and it spans their entire life." 3 0 The Court also
noted the potential for abuse if it approved a warrantless search of a phone incident
to arrest, positing that a person could be arrested for a minor traffic infraction, and
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, 36, 46, 57-58, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10- 1259).
20. Justice Kagan asked about the constitutionality of a future in which "all cars are going to have GPS
tracking systems, and the police could essentially hack into such a system without committing the trespass." Id. at
46.
21. Chief Justice Roberts noted that because license plates are state property, the possibility existed that he
state could put a GPS device "the size of a credit card ... behind the license plate" on any individual's vehicle. Id.
at 29-30.
22. Id. at 46. Stephen Leckar, the attorney for Jones, pointedly explained that if GPS systems were installed in
all vehicles, "that's because of manufacturers doing it, or because Congress has legislated it . . . ." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 58.
25. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) ("For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the
exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.").
26. Id. at 404.
27. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
28. Id. at 2480.
29. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-11, 27-29, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-132).
30. Id. at 28.
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then officers could search the individual's phone to learn virtually every detail of
the arrestee's life.31 In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Roberts refused to
extend search incident to arrest precedent to cell phones, holding that a warrant is
required before a search of an arrestee's cell phone.32 Despite being hailed as
victories for privacy advocates,33 neither Jones nor Riley identify a limiting
principle for government intrusion through comprehensive dataveillance and
34
cybersurveillance means.
The Court, however, was not blind to the need for a dramatic revision of Fourth
Amendment protections. During oral argument in Jones, and in concurrences by
Justices Alito and Sotomayor, the Court suggested that a nonintrusion test may be
more appropriate given the scope of developing technology. A nonintrusion test is
grounded in customary law, replacing an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
that is currently grounded in property and tort law, and presents a way to untether
concepts of privacy from nondisclosure.3 5
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores how precrime rationales
justify preventive policing through big data cybersurveillance systems. This
31. Justice Kagan stated:
And the police could take that phone and could look at every single e-mail that person has written,
including work e-mails, including e-mails to family members, very intimate communications,
could look at all that person's bank records, could look at all that person's medical data, could look
at that person's calendar, could look at that person's GPS and find out every place that person had
been recently because that person was arrested for driving without a seat belt.
Id. at 29-30.
32. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
33. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Why the Supreme Court May Finally Protect Your Privacy in the Cloud, WIRED
(June 26, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/why-the-supreme-court-may-finally-protect-your-privacy-in-
the-cloud/; Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0; Ateqah Khaki, Supreme Court
Rules Government Violated Privacy Rights in GPS Tracking Case, ACLU (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:29 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/supreme-court-rules-government-violated-privacy-rights-gps-tracking-case; US v. Jones,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-jones (last visited June 14, 2017).
34. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (explaining the Court's holding, which required
a warrant before a search of a cell phone incident to arrest); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012)
(explaining that "the present case does not require [the Court] to answer [the] question" of whether constant
electronic surveillance "without an accompanying trespass" is an "unconstitutional invasion of privacy").
Multiple scholars have explored in depth the constitutional implications of mass surveillance and cybersurveil-
lance technologies. See, e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE (2011); DAVID COLE & JULES
LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE (2007); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002);
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); JON L.
MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).
35. In a sister article, the discussion focuses more intensely on the origins of the Katz test and how current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has fared in the face of Fourth Amendment challenges to modern cybersurveil-
lance. See Margaret Hu, Orwell's 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH.
L. REV. 1819 (2018). In this Article, the discussion focuses more on the cybyersurveillance techniques. The goal is
to discuss how representative cybersurveillance technologies function, and why they appear to circumvent the
protections offered by Katz and its progeny.
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discussion helps to lay a foundation for why a nonintrusion test provides a method
to address Fourth Amendment concerns in the context of large-scale suspicionless
data surveillance and seizures. Part II discusses why suspicionless data screening
programs fall outside Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures under Katz. Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test may not
protect the data relied upon by contemporary cybersurveillance programs. None-
theless, these programs implicate Fourth Amendment concerns, as well as other
constitutional rights. Part III argues that a nonintrusion test is more appropriate in
these arenas than is Katz because of the nature of big data technology, cybersurveil-
lance, and bulk data collection practices. This Article concludes by arguing that,
due to rapid technological changes, the evolution of the Fourth Amendment is now
necessary, and the adoption of a non-intrusion test may provide greater protections
to constitutional freedoms than the Katz privacy test.
I. BIG DATA CYBERSURVEILLANCE AS PRECRIME
Jones, Riley, and other recent Fourth Amendment cases illuminate the limita-
tions of the Katz privacy test in the face of developing big data law enforcement
capabilities. Historically, under Katz, courts have analyzed Fourth Amendment
challenges by considering targeted law enforcement action, rather than suspicion-
less mass data tracking programs that encompass all individuals, and investigate
their data for indicia of suspicion.3 6 Automated and semi-automated data search
and seizure cases often appear in administrative and bureaucratized circumstances
different from typical law enforcement actions involving investigation of specific
individuals.3 7
For instance, the use of biometric databases and mass suspicionless surveillance
tools has become increasingly common by state and local law enforcement.
Geofeedia and other similar technologies demonstrate law enforcement's transi-
tion from small data policing to big data cybersurveillance.38 The spread of
suspicionless surveillance tools to law enforcement forecasts the future of modern
policing39 and highlights the growing gaps in existing Fourth Amendment doc-
trine. Government tools like FAST are embedded in the Administrative State and
are not typically seen as law enforcement tools, despite serving precrime gover-
nance ambitions. While FAST is still being tested by the Department of Homeland
36. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (2016) (explaining
that panvasive investigative techniques may not be considered searches and seizures and listing numerous
techniques that the Supreme Court has upheld against Fourth Amendment challenges).
37. See id. at 96 ("Because . . . panvasive searches and seizures are policy-driven, group-based, and
suspicionless, they are legislative in nature.").
38. For a discussion of some of these tools, see Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data
Governance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAw (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds.,
2017).
39. For a discussion of law enforcement use of mass surveillance tools, see Rushin, The Judicial Response,
supra note 3; Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (2013).
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Security, the No-Fly List, compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), is already in effect.4 0 The No-Fly List can fairly
be described as a precrime program because it is intended to prevent "individuals
[who] are known or suspected terrorists," from boarding planes.4 1 Although
predictive mass surveillance systems have yet to be prominently deployed,
Geofeedia and FAST are representative technologies that signal it is likely that the
use of such precrime technology will spread.
A. Geofeedia and Social Media Surveillance
Geofeedia, a social media surveillance software, combines social media posts
and geographic data into one platform.42 The software aggregates data from social
media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Periscope. At the
time it was revealed by media reports and civil rights organizations, Geofeedia
collected posts, identified them by username and other tags, and filtered them into
locational groups.4 3 Geofeedia uses a process known as "geofencing." Geofencing
builds a "virtual fence" around a designated physical location4 4 and permits social
media posts from that defined area to be identified and stored.45 Although social
media surveillance software companies like Geofeedia claim to be little more than
"aggregator[s] of public information,"4 6 media reports based on access to police
records claim that Geofeedia attempted to access private social media posts rather
than only the information users posted publicly.4 7
Geofeedia was initially funded by In-Q-Tel, a venture capital firm sponsored by
the CIA.4" Geofeedia had provided its services and technology to numerous police
40. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 (D. Or. 2014).
41. Id. ("TSC defines its reasonable-suspicion standard as requiring 'articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination that an individual is known or suspected to be, or
has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to, terrorism or terrorist
activities."') (internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of pre-crime programs, see Jennifer C. Daskal,
Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2014).
42. Ally Marotti, Chicago Police Used Geofeedia, the TweetDeck for Cops Under Fire from ACLU, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-geofeedia-police-surveillance-reports-bsi-
20161013-story.html.
43. Dell Cameron, Denver Police Spent $30K on Social Media Surveillance Tools in May, DAILY DOT (Sept.
19, 2017, 5:19 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/denver-police-geofeedia-social-media-monitoring/.
44. Jamie Wong, Daisy Sang & Chang-Shyh Peng, An Android Geofencing App for Autonomous Remote
Switch Control, 11 INT'L J. COMPUTER ELECTRICAL AUTOMATION CONTROL & INFO. ENGINEERING 319, 319 (2017).
45. Cameron, supra note 43.
46. Richard Byrne Reilly, All Your Social Media Posts Now Sorted by Location and Up for Sale, VENTUREBEAT
(Oct. 15, 2014,4:30 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2014/10/15/all-your-social-media-posts-are-now-in-the-public-
domain-forever/.
47. Dell Cameron, Dozens of Police-Spying Tools Remain After Facebook, Twitter Crack Down on Geofeedia,
DAILY DOT (Feb. 24, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/geofeedia-twitter-facebook-instagram-
social-media-surveillance/.
48. Lee Fang, The CIA Is Investing in Firms that Mine Your Tweets and Instagram Photos, INTERCEPT (Apr. 14,
2016, 1:57 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/14/in-undisclosed-cia-investments-social-media-mining-looms-
large/.
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forces,4 9 private companies, and schools.5 0 The Chicago police, for instance,
claimed to have used Geofeedia along with "publicly available tools . . . to
monitor open source social media for special events and functions (sporting
games, marathons, etc.)... .". Critics argue, however, that the software can be
used for discriminatory purposes and claim that Geofeedia's promotional materials
"suggest the product can be used in ways that target activists . "52 For example,
Geofeedia's documents explicitly identify unions and activist groups as "overt
threats."5 3 The ACLU of Northern California reports that Geofeedia "invite[d] the
Los Angeles District Attorney to learn how Baltimore used the software to monitor
and 'stay one step ahead of the rioters' after the police killing of Freddie Gray." 5 4
In addition to substantial constitutional concerns, the use of social media surveil-
lance and geofencing raises significant concerns about transparency and individual
accountability.55 After the ACLU disclosed information regarding law enforce-
ment's use of Geofeedia during protests, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram denied
Geofeedia access to their data in 2016.6 Geofeedia, however, is among many
57other companies that provide geofencing and social media surveillance services.
Law enforcement, therefore, may access a number of tools that permit officers to
draw inferences of suspicion about individuals based primarily on digital data.58
Because Geofeedia relies principally on publicly available social media informa-
tion, as well as people's presence in public places, law enforcement's use of
geofencing tools likely evades Fourth Amendment protection under established
49. Ozer, supra note 6.
50. Dell Cameron, CIA-Backed Surveillance Software Was Marketed to Public Schools, DAILY DOT (Oct. 18,
2016, 12:12 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/geofeedia-surveillance-software-high-school-chicago-social-
media-monitoring/.
51. Marotti, supra note 42 (quoting Chicago Police Department spokesman Anthony Guglielmi).
52. Ozer, supra note 6.
53. Id. (providing access to Geofeedia materials obtained by the ACLU).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Amina Elahi, Geofeedia Cuts Half of Staff After Losing Access to Twitter Facebook, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 21,
2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-geofeedia-cuts-jobs-surveillance-bsi-20161121-
story.html.
57. See, e.g., Kalev Leetaru, Geofeedia Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg: The Era of Social Surveillance, FORBES
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2016/10/12/geofeedia-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-
the-era-of-social-surveillence/#2883a6f55b90; Press Release, Att'y Gen. of Mass., AG Reaches Settlement with
Advertising Company Prohibiting 'Geofencing' Around Massachusetts Healthcare Facilities (Apr. 4, 2017),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2017/2017-04-04-copley-advertising-
geofencing.html.
58. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat 'Score', WASH. POST
(Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-
calculating-your-threat-score/2016/0 1/10/e42bccac-8el 5-1 1e5-baf4-bdf37355da0cstory.html?utmterm=.
b87984ddb5d4 (describing a software program in use by law enforcement that "scoured billions of data points,
including arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep Web searches and [a suspect's] social-
media postings" to calculate a "threat level").
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jurisprudence.5 9 Individuals who present themselves in public or post information
that is fully accessible to the public through social media could not reasonably
claim a legitimate expectation of privacy over such information under the Katz
privacy test.6 0
B. Future Attribute Screening Technology and Precrime Programs
Another developing technology that seems to fall outside the Katz test is FAST,
a DHS predictive policing tool intended to "equip security officials with quantita-
tive tools to rapidly assess potential and unknown threats."6 1 Predictive analytic
systems intended to predict and prevent future crimes, and acts of terrorism, have
been utilized with increasing frequency in the years following the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 .62 FAST, a post-9/11 program that is under development by
DHS, analyzes "specific psychophysiological signals and behavioral attributes,
e.g., respiration, cardiovascular response, eye movement, thermal measures, and
gross body movement of a screened individual" 63 to "evaluat[e] suspicious
behaviors and judg[e] the implications of those behaviors."6 4
The goal of FAST is to detect "malintent," a term that DHS defines as "the
mental state of an individual intending to cause harm to our citizens or infrastruc-
ture."6 FAST's technology is intended to identify individuals displaying character-
istics associated with malintent. The malintent analysis captures a broad range of
potential harms, including "the extent of planned harm, the future time horizon of
the event, and the consequences to the individual who is planning the event."6 7 The
FAST project also incorporates "passive stimuli" as a means for improving
59. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining that an individual in public has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in movements from one place to another); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742 (1979) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in information disclosed to others).
60. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. DHS/S&T/PIA-012 Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST)/ Passive Methods for Precision
Behavioral Screening, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (May 26, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsstpia-
012-future-attribute-screening-technology-fast-passive-methods-precision.
62. WALTER L. PERRY ET AL. PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAw ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS 3-5 (2013), http://www.rand.org/contentdam/rand/pubs/research-reports/RR200/RR233/RAND-
RR233.pdf (discussing the origins of predictive policing).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE FUTURE ATRIBUTE
SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 3 (2011), https://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia_012a-s%26t fast.pdf [hereinafter 2011 FAST PASSIVE METH-
ODS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
64. Id. at 2.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. SCI. & TECH. DIRECTORATE, FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY
(2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Future%20Attribute%2OScreening%2OTechnology-
FAST-508_0.pdf.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING
TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia_012-
s%26tfast-2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008 FAST PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
67. Id.
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accurate identification of malintent." Passive stimuli is defined as "the activation
by the environment of an individual's mental representations of malintent and
associated behavioral and physiological responses, without the need for an active
conversant response by the individual."69 In other words, it appears that FAST
attempts to detect an individual's future actions using, among other data, analysis
of an individual's physiological characteristics and responses to environmental
stimuli.
Although FAST does not collect personally identifiable information,0 substan-
tial concerns remain about government screening and data collection of personal
bodily functions.7 1 The efficacy of technologies such as FAST has been called into
question as well.72 Trials for FAST reported by DHS purport to demonstrate a 70%
success rate for identifying malintent. The field accuracy of FAST remains
unclear, as malintent detection is applied to volunteers who have been told to
engage in disruptive behavior-although the individuals conducting the screening
are unaware of which volunteers have malintent. Arguably, individuals who are
participating in a trial may have different physiological and emotional reactions
than individuals who really are intending to engage in misconduct. Real conditions
and simulated conditions may vary significantly, and some experts challenge
whether the accuracy of precrime technologies can be tested in advance or tested at
all.
Programs such as FAST potentially risk mass misidentification of innocent
individuals through false positives.6 Experts have questioned whether FAST
sensors will be able to accurately distinguish the attributes of malintent from the
physiological traits of flight anxiety, for instance. A reasonable suspicion
determination under FAST would be difficult to challenge.78 First, a defendant
would carry the burden of proving FAST's inaccuracy in challenging the lawful-
68. 2011 FAST PASSIVE METHODS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Pam Benson, Will Airports Screen for Body Signals? Researchers Hope So, CNN (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/06/security.screening/index.html?iref=nextin.
72. See, e.g., Sharon Weinberger, Terrorist 'Pre-Crime'Detector Field Tested in United States, NATURE (May
27, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110527/full/news.2011.323.html.
73. Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger & Kenneth Cukier, Should We Use Big Data to Punish Crimes Before They're
Committed?, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-03/should-we-use-big-
data-to-punish-crimes-before-theyre-committed#page-2.
74. 2008 FAST PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 66, at 3.




77. Weinberger, supra note 72.
78. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
327 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10
HARV. L. & PoL`Y REV. 15 (2016).
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ness of a detention under FAST.7 9 Second, an experienced officer alerted by a
system like FAST could easily identify a host of reasons why an individual was
targeted that are unrelated to the screening system. Third, it is difficult to imagine
how to litigate a case in which the defendant had not yet committed a crime, but
nonetheless faces administrative or criminal-like consequences.0 The use of a
system like FAST raises concerns about changes in individual and social expecta-
tions of privacy if the technology ever comes into widespread public use. The use
of geofencing tools like Geofeedia or other similar technologies presents similar
concerns. Yet, under the Katz test, these tools might not offend an individual
expectation of privacy because they rely on information that is not considered
"private," such as publicly available social media posts or an individual's biomet-
ric identifiers and physiological public presentment.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE KATZ PRIVACY TEST
In two recent cases, United States v. Jones and Riley v. California, the Supreme
Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment doctrine must evolve to limit
government intrusiveness in light of increasingly comprehensive and invasive
cybersurveillance technologies. The Court has yet to develop a new legal privacy
doctrine that replaces the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test established in
Katz."' The increasingly comprehensive nature of big data cybersurveillance
presents unprecedented types of society-wide intangible harms that could not have
been anticipated at the time Katz was decided. A dramatic revision of Fourth
Amendment doctrine is therefore necessary.
Katz's departure from existing Fourth Amendment precedent was motivated by
the Court's belief that the Fourth Amendment must be modified to address modern
government surveillance techniques.8 2 These techniques were unrestrained by
previous Fourth Amendment cases such as Goldman v. United States8 3 and
Olmstead v. United States8 4 that focused on "searches and seizures of tangible
property" as a prerequisite to finding a Fourth Amendment violation."5 In Katz, the
Court expanded the protection of the Fourth Amendment beyond constitutionally
protected areas, 6 and instead focused its inquiry on individual expectations of
privacy. 87
79. United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a defendant carries
the burden of proof of a Fourth Amendment violation in a motion to suppress).
80. See supra notes 40-41 (discussing the No-Fly List and the Administrative State).
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion).
83. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
84. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
86. Id. at 351 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
87. Id. at 351-52.
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The Court explained that what a "person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his home or office" is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, "[b]ut what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."8 8 The Court rejected the notion that a person placing a
phone call in a glass phone booth surrenders constitutional protection from
intrusion simply because he is visible while making the call.89 Instead, the relevant
fact was the individual's expectation that, by using a phone booth, he would
prevent third parties from hearing his conversation.90 The Court acknowledged the
need to adapt the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to match
technological and social developments: "To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication."9 1
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz sets forth the two-part test now used to
determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. The first step
requires determining whether "a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy."92 The second step requires determining whether "the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'93 Harlan
explained that while a telephone booth may be a public place, closing the door
transforms the booth into "a temporarily private place whose momentary occu-
pants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable."94
Harlan noted that modern technology had limited the usefulness of the trespass
doctrine because surveillance could be accomplished without intrusion: "Its
limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as
well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion."95
In place of the trespass doctrine, Katz left a more flexible reasonable expectation
of privacy test that protected against government intrusion, physical or otherwise,
so long as the targeted individual intended to keep his affairs private.96 Modern
technology has, however, created tension in applying the second step of Katz.97
Under the application of the Smith v. Maryland98 third party doctrine, "an
individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information provided to
88. Id.






95. Id. at 362.
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that the third
party doctrine is problematic in the digital age).
98. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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third parties."99 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Jones concurrence, "[t]his
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks." 0 0 This aspect is particularly problematic for suspicionless data
collection practices, which rely on information that is publicly available, provided
to third parties, or does not qualify as content (metadata)-or individual presence
in public spaces.
In recent Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has examined the utility of the
Katz test in light of modern surveillance techniques.o This examination is
essential if the Fourth Amendment is to maintain any bite, as the "reasonable
expectation" standard of Katz may lead to patently unreasonable r sults. The Court
has identified some discomfort with the scope of modern surveillance, but it has
struggled to articulate the point at which surveillance goes too far. Essentially, the
Justices know it when they see it,102 even if they are unable to clearly articulate
why surveillance that seems to fit within Katz's ambit potentially violates the
Fourth Amendment. The heart of this problem is that the Katz test does not appear
to be offended by cybersurveillance tools like geofencing and FAST that can
subject both citizens and noncitizens to mass, suspicionless, criminal, and national
security profiling through the collection and analysis of comprehensive databases
of personally identifiable information. 103 And as such, the Katz standard appears
inadequate for protecting Fourth Amendment values in the context of suspicionless
seizures of data and subsequent analysis of that data. Much like the Katz Court, the
current Court appears to be grappling with the impact of technology on Fourth
Amendment doctrine, and the Justices have noted the need for an evolution of that
doctrine. 104
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether warrantless
tracking of a criminal suspect through a GPS device attached to the suspect's
99. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F Supp. 2d 724, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd in part, vacated in part, ACLU v.
Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
100. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
102. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice Stewart famously noted that, although he cannot define pornography, he
"know[s] it when [he] see[s] it." 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In oral argument in United
States v. Jones, the Justices appeared to share a similar struggle with defining when surveillance had crossed the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment and came into tension with Katz. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 19, at 23-25.
103. For an excellent overview of the types of data collected and analyzed by the government for criminal and
national security profiling, see RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERN-
MENT DOES WITH AMERICANS' DATA (2013). For a summary of the implications of big data cybersurveillance,
including the consequences of big data "pre-crime" systems, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH
CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WIL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6-12 (2013);
Richards, supra note 3; Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013).
104. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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vehicle was constitutional. 105 Law enforcement agents attached a GPS device to
Jones's vehicle, where it remained for 28 days to allow for the tracking of the
vehicle's movements.1 0 6 During that time, the device calculated and transmitted
the vehicle's precise location to law enforcement at ten-second intervals.1 0 7
Officers used the GPS tracking data to discover a stash house containing large
amounts of narcotics.os The GPS device did not provide information about the
contents of Jones's Jeep or any conversations he had in the car-it only transmitted
his locational data on a constant basis.1 09 The technology itself was similar to the
"beeper" cases technology,1 o but the real difference was that it made long-term,
comprehensive surveillance feasible and automatically recorded the data that law
enforcement officers could review at their convenience.1 1
During oral argument, several Justices conceded that the expectation of privacy
test, as currently formulated, would not restrain the use of increasingly comprehen-
sive and invasive data-driven surveillance techniques.1 12 The tenor of the Justices'
questions suggested that the evolution of these technologies required a parallel
evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine to be consistent with modern cyber
developments.1 13 The government argued that the intrusiveness of increasingly
comprehensive surveillance methods is mediated by a public that has become
accustomed to being monitored by new forms of technology.'1 4 Nonetheless,
several of the Justices explored the option of modifying the Fourth Amendment
doctrine.1 1 5 The Court's discussion of potential modification of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence seemed to suggest hat the Katz test should lead with the social
105. Id. at 402 (majority opinion). Officers had obtained a warrant to install the device on a vehicle registered
to Jones's wife, which required them to install the GPS within ten days and in the District of Columbia. Id. at
402-03. Officers installed the device in Maryland after the ten-day period had expired. Id. at 403.
106. Id. at 403.
107. Id.; Brief for Respondent at 4, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259).
108. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403-04.
109. Brief for Petitioner at 49-50, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259) (explaining that the GPS device "does
not conduct either a visual or aural search of the item to which it is attached .. .. [I]t provides information only
about the vehicle's location").
110. See id. at 38 ("The GPS device used in this case conveyed the same type of information that the beeper
conveyed in Knotts-the approximate location of the object to which it was attached."); see also United States v.
Jones, 625 E3d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) ("There is no material difference between
tracking the movements of the Knotts defendant with a beeper and tracking the Jones appellant with a GPS.").
111. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Brief for Respondent at 24-28, Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 57-58.
112. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 24-25.
113. See id. at 3-4, 10-11.
114. See id. at 57 ("Today perhaps GPS can be portrayed as a 1984-type invasion, but as people use GPS in
their lives and for other purposes, our expectations of privacy surrounding our location may also change.").
Justice Kagan was immediately skeptical of this claim, posing the hypothetical that "a little robotic device
follow[s] you around 24 hours a day anyplace you go that's not your home, reporting in all your movements to the
police, to investigative authorities . . . ." Id. at 57-58. She noted that she was "not sure how one can say that" a
reasonable expectation of privacy would not be violated by such tracking. Id. at 58.
115. See id. at 50-51 (suggesting society may tolerate monitoring of someone police think may set off a huge
bomb, even if no probable cause exists).
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inquiry first.1 1 6 Under such a suggested approach, the Katz subjective-objective
test would instead become an objective-subjective test. 17
Ultimately, the Court decided Jones on narrow grounds,"" avoiding the oppor-
tunity to modify the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in the cyber
arena.119 Justice Scalia explained that either a trespass or a Katz invasion may be a
Fourth Amendment search:
Katz . . . established that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations, but did not snuf[f] out the previously recognized
protection for property . . .. Katz did not erode the principle that, when the
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected
area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 120
The two concurring opinions by Justices Alito and Sotomayor both attempted to
examine the broader issues at the heart of Jones. Justice Alito recognized that the
Katz test had the potential to accommodate increasing levels of government
intrusiveness. He explained that the "hypothetical reasonable person" is presumed
to have a "well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations."1 2 1 He noted that
technology can change expectations of privacy, a concern reflected in other Fourth
Amendment cases. 122 Justice Alito explained that individuals accept diminished
privacy as a "tradeoff' for "increased convenience or security" of new technology,
and may ultimately accept the tradeoff as inevitable.1 2 3 He recognized that the
Katz test is grounded in changing social norms that the Court must give effect to as
a form of customary law-the general social expectation about what can be kept
private.
Although Justice Alito did not fully explain how he would have resolved the
issue, his opinion offers a shift away from a privacy standard towards an intrusion
standard. He acknowledged the struggle the Court faced: "The best that we can do
in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the
use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a
116. See id. at 12-13, 44,51.
117. See id. at 22, 24, 57-58 (discussing objective perspectives on privacy); see also Hu, supra note 35.
118. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408-13 (2012).
119. Id. at 412-13. The role of cybersurveillance in governance, security goals, and database rights has formed
the basis for significant academic discourse in recent years. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD (2004);
BENJAMIN WirrEs, BROOKINGS INST., DATABUSE: DIGITAL PRIVACYAND THE MOSAIc (2011), http://www.brookings./
research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes; James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty,
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177 (1997); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264 (2004).
120. Jones, 565 U.S. at 407 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reasonable person would not have anticipated."'2 Alito's concurrence appears to
suggest a revision of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine because "intrusiveness"
is not precisely consistent with the reasonable expectation of privacy test.12 5
Justice Sotomayor's Jones concurrence also hinted at the need to shift from a
privacy standard to a nonintrusion standard. In addition, she stressed the need to
lead with an inquiry focusing on broad social concerns rather than individual
rights, when considering the potential Fourth Amendment harms from
cybersurveillance.12 6
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court considered a pair of cases with a
common issue: "whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested."1 2 7
In both cases, officers discovered a cell phone in a search incident to an arrest.128
The officers then looked through the phones and discovered evidence that was
used to prosecute the arrestees.129 Each arrestee-David Riley and Brima Wurie-
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the phone searches, arguing that the
search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.1 3 0 In Riley's case, the California
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction based on California precedent.13 1 Wurie,
however, fared better in the First Circuit on appeal. There, the court held that cell
phones "are distinct from other physical possessions that may be searched incident
to arrest without a warrant, because of the amount of personal data cell phones
contain and the negligible threat they pose to law enforcement interests."1 32
Finding for the arrestees, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion focused on the
relationship between technological developments and privacy and hearkened back
to fundamental constitutional principles. According to the Chief Justice, cell
phones raise both qualitative and quantitative privacy concerns that differ from
other items of personal property found uring a search incident to an arrest.
Specifically, cell phones contain "vast quantities of personal information"1 3 3
124. Id. at 430.
125. Justice Alito's concurrence appears to focus primarily on identifying the flaws in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion. See id. at 424-31 (discussing the flaws in the Katz test in relation to technological and social changes and
suggesting that a legislative solution may be the best option). Compare id. at 430 (asking if the GPS "involved a
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated"), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979) (explaining that the first inquiry under Katz is "whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy'-whether . . . the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve
[something] as private."' (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 351 (1967))).
126. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
127. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
128. Id. at 2480-81.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2481-82.
131. Id. at 2481 ("The court relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Diaz, which held
that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an arrest, so long as the cell
phone was immediately associated with the arrestee's person." (citing People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011))).
132. Id. at 2482.
133. Id. at 2485.
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available by storage capacity, functionality, and the possibility of remote cloud
access.13 4 Chief Justice Roberts cited Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in
Jones, pointing out that the data on a phone and apps can provide extraordinary
quantities of information about a person's private life. 13 5 A cell phone "contains in
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains
a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form-unless
the phone is." 1 3 6 The Chief Justice explained that the nature of technology did not
alter the fundamental principles upon which American democracy was founded.1 37
Analogizing the scope of a warrantless search of a cell phone to the "reviled"
general warrant, Chief Justice Roberts concluded: "The fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."1 38
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts's
resort to "predigital" rules. Reiterating points made in his Jones concurrence, Alito
argued that the transformation of technology "calls for a new balancing of law
enforcement and privacy interests."1 39 Justice Alito added, however, that such
transformation should be done by the legislature, rather than "the federal courts
using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment."1 4 0
Both Jones and Riley marked a victory for those seeking robust Fourth
Amendment protections in the face of technological advancement. In Jones, the
Court's resolution of the case rejected the government's main contention that
warrantless installation of a GPS device was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.14 1 In Riley, the Court highlighted the importance of privacy in the
digital age and its relationship to changing technology. In both cases, however, the
Court avoided the larger question of how to address emerging cybersurveillance
and dataveillance technologies. These cases represent the most recent collisions
between cybersurveillance technology and the limits of Fourth Amendment
doctrine in the Supreme Court,14 2 and the Court still has not fully come to grips
134. Id. at 2491.
135. Id. at 2490 (noting that a GPS can generate precise records of "familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations") (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 2491.
137. Id. at 2494-95 (discussing the founding generation's motivations for creating the Fourth Amendment and
arguing that technological developments in how private information is stored does not alter the protections
accorded that information).
138. Id. at 2495.
139. Id. at 2496-97 (Alito, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2497.
141. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
142. At the time this Article was written, the Court had recently granted certiorari in United States v.
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), which addressed the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure and
search of cell site tower location information. See Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting
certiorari).
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with the implications modern cybersurveillance has for individual privacy.143
Although Justice Alito's concurrences in Riley and Jones point to legislatures as
the solution to the "diminution of privacy,"1 4 4 any test that revolves around an
increasingly fleeting concept of privacy will likely become insufficient o protect
Fourth Amendment freedoms threatened by mass surveillance. Such surveillance
threatens more than just the Fourth Amendment. 145 For that reason, a new theory
of the Fourth Amendment is essential.
III. TOWARDS A THEORY OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT NONINTRUSION TEST
In a small data world, physical intrusions1 4 6 and bodily intrusions1 4 7 were
primarily at the forefront of the Fourth Amendment inquiry.148 Increasingly, the
143. See, e.g., Sherry F Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits ofthe Right
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REv. 889 (2004); William Funk, Electronic
Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80 Miss. L.J. 1491 (2011); Ren6e McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409 (2007). Other scholars examine
statutory frameworks for governing surveillance technologies and for structuring domestic and foreign intelli-
gence surveillance law. They recommend the enactment of congressional legislation to resolve any potential
harms emanating from modern cybersurveillance, rather than reliance upon the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
607 (2003); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 857-60 (2004); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1308 (2004) (explaining that Supreme Court drew distinction between
domestic and "foreign intelligence" surveillance and what procedures were required under the Fourth Amend-
ment). Swire writes:
Supporters of surveillance could gain by a statutory system that expressly authorized foreign
intelligence wiretaps, lending the weight of congressional approval to surveillance that did not
meet all the requirements of ordinary Fourth Amendment searches. Critics of surveillance could
institutionalize a series of checks and balances on the previously unfettered discretion of the
President and the Attorney General to conduct surveillance in the name of national security.
Swire, supra, at 1308.
144. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 427-28 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
145. See Strossen, supra note 4, at 1145-46.
146. The term physical intrusions, as used here, refers to seizures of individuals. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (permitting a search of a student when it is reasonable in relation to
the scope of the circumstances justifying the search); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)
(explaining that a seizure of an individual for an arrest requires either a show of force or submission to authority);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (explaining that aFourthAmendment seizure has occurred
when under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (permitting a brief, investigatory detention and search of outer clothing for weapons as
"a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment").
147. The term bodily intrusions refers to actions that intrude into an individual's body. See Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (concluding that warrantless blood tests are not permitted under the Fourth
Amendment because they are "significantly more intrusive" than breath testing); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1977 (2013) (finding that "the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one");
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (finding that exigent circumstances permitted warrantless
blood testing to secure evidence of blood alcohol content).
148. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (describing case precedent addressing searches incident to arrest).
CYBERSURVEILLANCE INTRUSIONS AND THE KATZ PRIVACY TEST
Court appears to now recognize, however, that he physicality of the intrusion is no
longer the primary threat in a big data world. 149 In Jones, which was resolved on
the physical intrusion, the concurrences of Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor
demonstrate a growing awareness by the Court that cybersurveillance intrusions
were now at the forefront of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Justices Alito and
Sotomayor reasoned that cybersurveillance presents exactly the type of non-
physical intrusive harm that is proscribed under the Katz privacy test.15 0
Technologies such as Geofeedia and FAST, and other emerging cybersurveil-
lance tools, present especially difficult challenges to the Fourth Amendment. This
is in part because cybersurveillance intrusions have not been explicitly defined by
the Court. Federal courts, however, increasingly show a recognition of factors
relevant to a determination as to whether a cybersurveillance intrusion has
occurred: cost, duration of tracking or storage duration of information collected,
mass ubiquity and suspicionless nature of the surveillance, automation- and
data-oriented tools, surreptitious and virtual methods, comprehensive profiling
capacity, and potential for facilitating digitized analysis and algorithmic
decision-making.
Justice Sotomayor observes that because cybersurveillance, like the GPS
monitoring at issue in Jones, "is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks
that constrain abusive law enforcement practices."1 5 1 Cybersurveillance monitor-
ing may be short-term or long-term, and it may be suspicionless or targeted.
Additionally, cybersurveillance may or may not result in any law enforcement or
other consequence beyond the act of data collection, database screening, and
digitized analysis.15 2 In Jones, Justice Alito pointed out the surveillance dangers of
long-term monitoring that is possible through extended gathering of geo-locational
data through warrantless GPS tracking.15 3 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the
potential Fourth Amendment harms were not contingent upon duration or enforce-
ment action-these issues may not be relevant to the constitutional inquiry.154
Therefore, Justice Sotomayor explained, "[i]n cases involving even short-term
monitoring, some unique attributes of [cybersurveillance] relevant to the Katz
149. See, e.g., id. at 2488-89 (pointing out that the scope of privacy intrusions is far greater with access to
digital data); Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 ("Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively
property-based approach [to the Fourth Amendment]."); Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("In
Katz, this Court enlarged its then-prevailing focus on property rights by announcing that the reach of the Fourth
Amendment does not 'turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion."' (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967))).
150. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[A]s Justice Alito notes,
physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.").
151. Id. at 415-16.
152. Id. at 415 ("The government can store such [digitized] records and efficiently mine them for years into the
future.").
153. Id. at 428-30 (Alito, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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analysis will require particular attention."1 5 5 Both Justice Alito and Justice
Sotomayor expressed concern regarding broader constitutional harms of cybersur-
veillance,5  including the chilling of expressive and associational freedoms.
A test centered on societal nonintrusion, rather than personal privacy, is more
appropriate to address the growing challenges of cybersurveillance technology and
the harms emanating from the protocols and programs of bureaucratized cybersur-
veillance. To explore what the contours of a nonintrusion test might be, it is first
necessary to examine the shortcomings of the Katz privacy test. Under the Katz
test, a court first analyzes whether the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy has been offended.15" The second step of Katz requires a court to consider
whether society objectively ratifies the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy.159 In both steps, however, the focus is on the individual's harm. The
nonintrusion test implicitly suggested by the concurrences in United States v.
Jones shifts the Fourth Amendment analysis from an individual's harm to a
society-wide harm. Instead of requiring the individual to show a subjective
reasonable expectation of privacy, the nonintrusion test instead first requires the
government to justify the intrusion of the surveillance. 160 The significant question
would be whether a societal-wide, objective expectation of governmental nonintru-
sion has been offended.
In other words, a court would need to understand not just how a surveillance
program intrudes upon an individual's life but how that program intrudes upon
everyone's life, across society.1 6 1 Cybersurveillance often requires amassing a
database of information across certain sectors of society in order to be effective, or
indeed, all of society. 162 That would be the context from which a court should
properly understand the implications of ratifying such surveillance as free of any
155. Id.
156. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[S]ociety's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual[] . . . .").
157. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Awareness that the government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.").
158. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
159. Id.
160. Justices on the Supreme Court have previously considered shifting the burden to the government. United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 793 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he burden of guarding privacy in a free
society should not be on its citizens; it is the Government that must justify its need to electronically eavesdrop.").
161. See, e.g., Gray & Citron, supra note 2, at 71-72 (arguing that the threshold question in a Fourth
Amendment inquiry should be "whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate
surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a
surveillance state. .. ."); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, Obama v.
Klayman, 800 F3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("Thus, plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of showing that their
privacy interests outweigh the Government's interest in collecting and analyzing bulk telephony metadata and
therefore the NSA's bulk collection program is indeed an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.").
162. See Klayman, 957 F Supp. 2d at 39 ("To my knowledge, however, no court has ever ecognized a special
need sufficient to justify continuous, daily searches of virtually every American citizen without any particularized
suspicion. In effect, the Government urges me to be the first non-FISC judge to sanction such a dragnet.").
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Fourth Amendment restrictions. Next, a court would consider whether the subjec-
tive expectation of protection from government intrusion was reasonable. This
inquiry would focus on whether an intrusion had occurred, rather than individual-
ized expectations of privacy.
Adoption of a nonintrusion test potentially resolves many of the problems posed
by cybersurveillance technological developments under th  third party doctrine.
Because the primary inquiry would no longer center on an individualized "expec-
tation of privacy," whether an individual had voluntarily shared digital data with
third parties like internet service providers or telecommunications companies
would no longer control the Fourth Amendment analysis.
It is undisputed that the Court continues to struggle with how best to preserve
the integrity of the Fourth Amendment in the face of changing technology and the
different harms threatened by that technology.16 3 Property and tort law, the
traditional anchors of Fourth Amendment doctrine, cannot protect against the types of
harms caused by this advancing technology.16 4 Technology increasingly implicates
the search and seizure of data of entire populations of individuals, particularly
surveillance methods that turn on the accumulation and storage of information in
databases. In such cases, the invasion of privacy suffered by an individual has as its
starting point a much broader harvesting of social information across entire sectors
of society. A socially-oriented framework of a kind of customary law165 is now
more appropriate to preserve the first principles of the Fourth Amendment because
the dangers are presented to autonomy and freedom that make up an open
democratic society.1 6 6 The oral argument in Jones made clear an almost visceral
objection to ratifying the government surveillance at issue there, even without an
articulate legal rationale for why the Fourth Amendment was offended. Modern
surveillance technologies have the capacity to threaten democratic norms and
customs. These fundamental democratic principles must be articulated and pre-
served as society negotiates the tolerable boundaries of ongoing, pervasive
cybersurveillance.
A nonintrusion test offers a more flexible and suitable method to evaluate
whether the spirit of the Fourth Amendment has been violated. This test shifts the
163. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the
applicability of the third party doctrine to modern technology and Fourth Amendment analysis).
164. Id. at 405 (majority opinion) ("The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property,
since otherwise it would have referred simply to 'the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures'; the phrase 'in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' would have been superfluous.").
165. We can identify the standard as customary because it requires considering f society would ratify an
individual expectation of privacy "under the circumstances" in which the individual held it. See Katharine T.
Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DuKE L.J. 535, 540 (2012); Curtis
A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010); Curtis A. Bradley
& Neil Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO.
L.J. 255 (2017); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1113, 1117 (1999); Hu, supra note 35.
166. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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calculation away from determining which levels of privacy are reasonable, or
whether a hypothetical reasonable person would shield such information. This
shift is critical because modern big data technologies necessitate sharing private
information with a wide range of third parties. Indeed, vast numbers of standard
consumer-oriented technologies require sharing data with third parties and are
often interconnected. As our society orients towards ever-diminishing degrees of
personal privacy through the confluence of technological and geopolitical factors,
nonintrusion as the basis for Fourth Amendment safeguards is important to protect
society's and citizens' constitutionally-protected emocratic rights. Otherwise,
citizens confront a choice between availing themselves of the conveniences and
necessities of contemporary technology and surrendering individual privacy that
has been historically protected.
At this juncture, a nonintrusion test may raise more questions than it answers.
Still, it appears the Court is cautiously moving in this direction.1 6 7 Legal scholar-
ship has recognized that much current Fourth Amendment doctrine is threatened
with obsolescence in the current context.16" The Table below sets forth some
observations for discussion of what might be construed as the most salient
differences between a non-intrusion test and the Katz privacy test.
Table 1: Distinctions Between the Jones Nonintrusion Test v. Katz Privacy
Test
Key Nonintrusion Test Katz Privacy Test
Under Fourth Amendment Under Fourth Amendment17 0
(Pertaining to emerging mass
surveillance and cybersurveillance
methods)1 6 9
Government Action in Question: Government Action in Question:
Unreasonable search and seizure Unreasonable search and seizure
of digitally constructed identity of person and property1 7 2
and personally identifiable digital
data17 1
167. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 417-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 22, 24, 57-58.
168. See supra note 2.
169. See Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
170. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
171. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402.
172. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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173. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (presenting prima facie challenges to a
provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008, which empowers the FISC to
authorize surveillance without a showing of probable cause that he target of surveillance is an agent of a foreign
power).
174. See id.
175. Jones, 565 U.S. at 410-12.
176. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
177. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the validity of the third party doctrine, as
applied to modern technology).
178. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (articulating the third party doctrine).
Key Nonintrusion Test Katz Privacy Test
When the tests Paradigmatic Case: Mass analytics Paradigmatic Case: Government
are used and predictive analytics to searching and seizing contents
anticipate guilt or predict future of one's diary or letters1 7 4
wrongdoing; "Precrime":
Government searching and seizing
personally identifiable data of
mass populations or
subpopulations and locating
suspects based on data searches;
and determine one's probabilistic
likelihood or statistical
predisposition to commit crime or
terrorism1 7 3
Unlikely to be used by police Commonly used by police
(unless, for example, a traffic stop
was generated by an algorithm)
Expectations Expectation of Nonintrusion under Expectation of Privacy under
under the tests Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Fourth Amendment: Reasonable
expectation to be free of expectation of privacy and
unreasonable cybersurveillance expectation o be free of
and government intrusion 1 7 5  unreasonable government
searches and seizures of physical
person and physical
possessions176
No third-party doctrine: Third party doctrine: No
Expectation of nonintrusion does expectation of privacy if
not pivot on whether information information shared with third
was shared with party17 8
others 177
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179. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971) ("It guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to
Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REv. 525, 534 (1993) (noting that the Constitution creates affirmative
duties), Gray, A Collective Right, supra note 4, at 199-200; Gray, Dangerous Dicta, supra note 3, at 1196.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment describes a right against governmental interference rather than an
affirmative right to engage in protected conduct"); Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 772 (1992) ("Thus, Fourth Amendment rights are seldom
considered positive rights. Rather, the Court generally views them as restraints on law enforcement to be
acknowledged, but not taken seriously.").
181. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-08 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88
(1988)).
182. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
183. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57, (referring to George Orwell's 1984).
184. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Key Nonintrusion Test Katz Privacy Test
Grounded in the positive right Grounded in the negative right
perspective (or hybrid) of the perspective of the Fourth
Fourth Amendment: "The right of Amendment: Free from
the people to be secure in their "unreasonable searches and
persons, houses, papers, and seizures."180
effects"1 7 9
Objective inquiry is leading Subjective inquiry is currently
question: Objectively, does society the leading question in Katz
have a reasonable expectation to privacy test: Subjectively, does
be protected from government the individual have a reasonable
intrusion (e.g., big data expectation of privacy (e.g.,
cybersurveillance) in this expected personal information
particular instance?' 8 1  would be kept private) in this
particular instance?18 2
Focus of judicial Vantage Point of Inquiry: Societal Vantage Point of Inquiry:
inquiry under interest in open democratic society Personal interest in maintaining
the tests (e.g., to be free from "1984"-type information private8 4
surveillance). 183
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185. See Jones, 565 U.S. 400; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
187. See, United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
188. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
189. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
190. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 13, 25,
27, 33, 35, 57 (discussing George Orwell's 1984 in relation to broad surveillance).
191. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Key Nonintrusion Test Katz Privacy Test
Government must first Individual must first
demonstrate mass surveillance or demonstrate individual-based
cybersurveillance method is subjective privacy interest is
necessary and efficacious (e.g., protected under Fourth
Fourth Amendment special needs Amendment'8 6 and provide
doctrine or special needs evidence of unreliability.18 7
exception to Fourth Amendment
applies)18 5
Big Data Cybersurveillance: Era Small Data Surveillance: Era of
of digital-based and analog-based information
database-driven information
Intangible Harms: Realm of Tangible Harms: Physical or
virtual reality, virtual property-based harms, realm of
cybersurveillance, and artificial traditional notion of reality and
intelligence and/or algorithmic human intelligence and
intelligence sensory-based surveillance
Need for the tests Protection from Big Data Protection from unwanted
inferences of guilt or suspicion revelatory information; physical
from correlative data-driven trespass; and reputational or
evidence and algorithms (e.g., privacy tort harms1 8 9
Protection from "guilty until
proven innocent" status)8
Concurrences and oral argument Before Jones: Conceptualization
in Jones: Suggestion that that individual-based rights
societal-based rights may now center the normative
center the normative commitment of the Fourth
commitment of the Fourth Amendment9 1
Amendment9 0
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Key Nonintrusion Test Katz Privacy Test
Where the tests Constitutional implications of Constitutional implications of
originated mass cybersurveillance and warrantless tracking or
warrantless, suspicionless tracking suspicionless surveillance of
play out on public, society-wide individual suspect unfold on
level192  personal, individual-rights
levell9 3
Grounded in Customary Law194 Grounded in Property Law and
Tort Law1 9 5
Future direction Nonintrusion appears to be Privacy is current axis for
of the tests transforming into the potential doctrinal analysis under Fourth
new axis for doctrinal analysis Amendment inquiry after
under cybersurveillance-oriented Katz1 97
Fourth Amendment inquiry after
Jones196
CONCLUSION
Courts are increasingly confronted with the limitations of current Fourth
Amendment doctrine when provided the opportunity to review big data cybersur-
veillance programs. The Katz test-although it is an evolving one, and one that
must continue to evolve in light of new cybersurveillance methods-is an
important starting point for a Fourth Amendment analysis of the types of harms
posed by non-physical cybersurveillance intrusions. Yet the scope of protections
afforded by the Katz privacy test fails to encompass the types of harms presented
by new technologies such as Geofeedia and FAST. Under the two-part Katz test,
first, it is unlikely that an individual can successfully establish a subjective
reasonable expectation of privacy because modern cybersurveillance collects and
captures data that has been disclosed over social media, the internet, and in public.
Second, as big data cybersurveillance systems are normalized and integrated into
preexisting bureaucratized settings, it will be increasingly difficult to find that a
privacy expectation that rejects these types of mass surveillance systems is
objectively reasonable.
In both Jones and Riley, the Justices acknowledged the limitations of privacy
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment as a result of advancing technologies.
192. See Balkin, supra note 4; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4.
193. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
194. The appropriate role of custom in law, and how and when custom transforms into something that is
cognizable as embodying the force of law, is a topic central to a robust debate in the international law context. See
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 165.
195. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 370 (Black, J., dissenting).
196. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
197. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The Court recognized that the relationship between an increasingly digitized
society and an increasingly digitized law enforcement structure was changing the
balance of power between citizen and State. The Court signaled, therefore, the
scope of mass intrusions made possible by cybersurveillance demands an evolu-
tion of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Court's suggestion of a nonintrusion
test to replace the Katz privacy test is intended to preserve core constitutional
values by leading with an inquiry that centers on societal interests.
